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ABSTRACT
Objective: To give guidance in deﬁning probability distributions for
model inputs in probabilistic sensitivity analysis (PSA) from a full Bayesian
perspective.
Methods: A common approach to deﬁning probability distributions for
model inputs in PSA on the basis of input-related data is to use the
likelihood of the data on an appropriate scale as the foundation for the
distribution around the inputs. We will look at this approach from a
Bayesian perspective, derive the implicit prior distributions in two
examples (proportions and relative risks), and compare these to alternative
prior distributions.
Results: In cases where data are sparse (in which case sensitivity analysis
is crucial), commonly used approaches can lead to unexpected results. We
show that this is because of the prior distributions that are implicitly
assumed, namely that these are not as “uninformative” or “vague” as
believed. We propose priors that we believe are more sensible for two
examples and which are just as easy to apply.
Conclusions: Input probability distributions should not be based
on the likelihood of the data, but on the Bayesian posterior distri-
bution calculated from this likelihood and an explicitly stated prior
distribution.
Keywords: Bayesian methods, maximum likelihood estimation, prior
probability distribution, probabilistic sensitivity analysis.
Background
In economic evaluation employing modeling techniques, the
model typically contains several unknown parameters [1]. The
outcome of a study will depend on the values that are postulated
for these parameters. These parameters are seldom based on hard
facts; in most cases, there is uncertainty about their magnitude.
Probabilistic sensitivity analysis (PSA) has become the state-
of-the-art method for determining the uncertainty in the
outcomes of cost-effectiveness calculations for health-care inter-
ventions because of the uncertainty in input parameters. For
instance, in the UK, the National Institute for Clinical Excellence
recommendations state that PSA should be employed in order to
yield unbiased estimates of expected net monetary beneﬁts, and
more importantly, to characterize decision uncertainty [2–4].
In a PSA [5], the uncertainty in each parameter is quantiﬁed
in terms of a probability distribution of this parameter. One then
carries out a Monte Carlo simulation, in which one randomly
draws one value for each parameter from its probability distri-
bution and then calculates the outcome corresponding to the set
of parameters drawn. This process is repeated M times, yielding
M outcome values that represent the distribution of the outcome
values (for a given choice of the distributions of the input param-
eters of the model). PSA is a conceptually simple and intuitive
method, and as such has considerable appeal. It can be seen as an
implementation of Bayesian statistics, as the view that param-
eters have a probability distribution is a hallmark of the Bayesian
outlook. Moreover, the decision context in which economics
evaluations are carried out is essentially Bayesian [6,7].
Parameter values usually come from data that are collected in
a single study, studies that combine data from multiple studies
(meta-analysis), expert opinion, or applying complex methods of
Bayesian evidence synthesis [8]. An important step in performing
a PSA is deﬁning the probability distribution to quantify the
uncertainty in the input parameters. One guide in this ﬁeld
(Briggs et al. [9] hereafter called BCS) describes methods to ﬁt
distributions of parameter values “directly to the data.” In our
experiences, this book, which grew out of a popular course on
health economic modeling, is a popular guide for those carrying
out cost-effectiveness analyses, and its methods are followed
widely. Although it clearly states (and advocates) the Bayesian
context of decision modeling, and describes the underlying
theory, this guide’s ﬁnal recommendations with respect to the
choice of input probability distributions are not discussed from
the viewpoint of the underlying Bayesian prior distributions. We
are aware that a Bayesian perspective with respect to the choice
of input probability distributions may scare some applied
modelers.
However, as we will argue below, if seen from a Bayesian
perspective, ﬁtting parameter values “directly to the data”
implies choices for prior distributions that need justiﬁcation, as,
in our opinion, more suitable alternative choices are possible.
More importantly, we argue that in the case of some parameters,
it is just as easy to estimate input probability distributions by
assuming a more sensible alternative prior distribution. We will
elaborate on two important types of parameters, namely a prob-
ability (or proportion), and a ratio (e.g., a relative risk [RR]).
Although the prior distribution plays only a minor role whenever
data are abundant, this is not always the case, especially given the
current trend toward modeling of many speciﬁc subgroups [10].
Also, as our proposals are just as simple to use as those proposed
in BCS, there are no practical reasons for not using them.
Our article is conﬁned to the situation where the uncertainty
of different parameters in the model is assumed to be mutually
independent, for instance in cases where they are based on dif-
ferent sources. When multiple parameters are correlated, for
instance because they are based on the same data source, the
correlation between the uncertainty should also be taken into
account. If not, the outcome of the PSA might be severely biased
[11–13]. Also, in the case that input parameters are based on
Bayesian evidence synthesis of trial data, there will be correlation
between the estimates of individual parameters. In all these cases,
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the PSA should sample from the joint posterior distribution of
these parameters. This topic, although important in many situa-
tions, is not dealt with here.
The structure of the article is the following. First, we will
discuss the implicit prior distributions for ratio and proportion
parameters obtained by ﬁtting distributions “directly to the
data” (as described by BCS) from a Bayesian perspective. Next,
we derive alternative prior distributions and show that their use
leads to more intuitive input distributions for PSA.
Being a Bayesian
From a Bayesian point of view, the distributions that enter as
input into the PSA are themselves “posterior distributions” based
both on a “prior distribution” and on the data according to the
following central formula in Bayesian statistics:
p x p x pθ θ θ( ) ∝ ( ) × ( ) (1)
This formula states that the posterior distribution of the input
parameter (p(q|x)) is proportional to the product of the likeli-
hood of the data (p(x|q)) and the prior distribution of the param-
eter q. The posterior distribution (p(q|x)) is the distribution we
want to use in our PSA, as this gives the probability distribution
of the parameter after we take the data into account.
Fitting input distributions directly to the data has consider-
able appeal as it seems to avoid the potentially messy business of
having to choose a prior. However, this is deceiving: the methods
as described in BCS implicitly assume a particular prior distribu-
tion. In their chapter on choosing distributions for input para-
meters, BCS give guidelines for the choice of distributions for
(among others) proportions and ratios. In the case of a propor-
tion, other possible priors are discussed by BCS in their technical
appendix to that chapter, and distributions based on other priors
are also applied in another article from Briggs et al. [14].
However, if we consider the underlying prior distributions, their
ﬁnal recommendations would not be our preference. In the case
of a ratio, we propose an alternative prior that, as far as we
know, has not yet been discussed in the health economic litera-
ture. Although we did not come up with this prior for that
particular purpose, this alternative prior also obviates the short-
coming of the expected value of the input distribution not being
equal to the point estimate as computed from the data. As the
binomial proportion lends itself well to explaining the Bayesian
method, we will discuss this ﬁrst.
Binomial Proportion
For the binomial proportion, BCS advise using a beta distribu-
tion characterized by two parameters a and b, and propose to use
the number of positive outcomes observed in the data for a, and
the number of negative outcomes for b. This approach implies a
so-called Haldane prior distribution, which is proportional to
p-1(1 - p)-1 (where p is the proportion). Alternative distributions
to use in PSA are beta(a + 1, b + 1) (assuming a uniform prior),
or beta(a + 0.5, b + 0.5) (assuming a Jeffrey’s prior, proportional
to p-1/2(1 - p)-1/2) [15,16]. Figure 1 displays the probability
density functions for these different prior distributions. To illus-
trate the differences between using alternative priors, we take the
following simple example: In a trial, there are two arms, each
with 100 patients. The object of study is (among other outcomes)
the overall mortality, which in our example is rare: there is only
one death in arm A, while there are 0 deaths in arm B. Figure 2
displays the posterior probabilities based on these data using the
three different priors.
If we use these posterior distributions in a PSA, using (for
illustrational purposes) a model that just copies the input to the
output, we get a distribution of output values which would look
exactly like Figure 2. Using the distributions based on the
Haldane prior, the means of the output values from PSA are
equal to the empirical rates, (0 and 0.01, respectively), while this
is not the case when using the posteriors based on the other
priors. This can be seen as an advantage of using the Haldane
prior. The use of the Haldane prior, however, has also a serious
drawback: in the case that either a or b is zero (i.e., the empirical
proportion is 0 or 100%), the resulting distribution is no longer
a proper probability distribution: beta(0,b) or beta(a,0) repre-
sents complete certainty that the value really is 0% or 100%, also
in the case where data are scarce. So, if none of two patients die
in a particular situation, it means that the a posteriori probability
of dying in similar situations is taken to be zero with complete
certainty. Common sense tells that this is not realistic.
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Figure 1 Possible prior probability for a binomial proportion: Haldane prior
(dashed line), Jeffrey’s prior (solid line), and uniform prior (dotted line).
The Haldane prior has an inﬁnitely large value at P = 0 and P = 1, and inﬁnitely
small values at P-values in between. Although all values in between 0 and 1
are inﬁnitely small, they are not all equal, as shown by our plotted function.
0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06
mortality rate
20
40
60
80
100
probability density
0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06
mortality rate
20
40
60
80
100
probability density
Figure 2 Resulting posterior probability density distributions for the data: 0
death in 100 participants (upper plot) and 1 death in 100 participants (lower
plot) using a Haldane prior (dashed line), a Jeffrey’s prior (solid line), or a
uniform prior (dotted lines).
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The advantage of using the Haldane prior is that the posterior
mean is equal to the empirical rate. This resembles the advantage
of the maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) for a proportion in
statistics. An MLE estimate gives the parameter value at which
the likelihood of the data is at its maximum and also yields a
result equal to the empirical rate. The argument therefore might
be made that using a Haldane prior conforms more to common
methods of statistical analysis. We therefore will brieﬂy review
the arguments behind the MLE.
First, the MLE can be seen as the maximum of the posterior
distribution given a uniform prior. This posterior is given by
the dotted line in Figure 2. The likelihood (apart from a nor-
malizing constant) also looks like the dotted line in Figure 2.
The MLE is, in statistical terms, thus equal to the posterior
mode of a posterior distribution based on a uniform prior dis-
tribution, rather than to the posterior mean of this posterior
distribution.
The philosophy leading to using the mode rather than the
mean of the likelihood in MLE estimation has (among others) to
do with what is called asymptotic unbiasedness and efﬁciency:
the ﬁrst means that if one repeats the experiment an inﬁnite
number of times, the MLE will give the true answer on average.
For instance, if the real mortality is 1 in 200, then repeating the
experiment with N = 100 many times will give 60.6% trials with
0 cases, 30.4% trials with one case, 7.6% trials with two cases,
and 1,4% trials with three or more cases. This implies that
60.6% of the MLEs are equal to 0, 30.4% are equal to 0.01,
7.6% are equal to 0.02, and 1.4% are equal to 0.03 or more. On
average, the MLE than is 0.005.
Efﬁciency means that the average amount that the estimate is
“off target” (deﬁned as the root mean square error) is as small as
possible. This is related to the fact that if the size of the experi-
ment increases (say you have 1000 patients with 0 or 10 deaths),
the MLE stays in place (while the posterior mean will not). These
characteristics, however, are not of much use in PSA: one does
not have data from repeating the experiment many times: the
knowledge that a particular estimate is “on average” unbiased
and precise does not tell you whether it is right or precise in this
particular case. Common sense will tell that an observation of 0
or 1 deaths in a group of 100 persons in most cases will not mean
that the true mortality rate is exactly 0 or 0.01, but rather that it
is compatible with many other “true” values beside 0.0 or 0.01.
Also, although an observation of 0 deaths in 100 participants
gives the same empirical rate as 0 in 10,000 participants, the true
mortality rates that are compatible with these data will be lower
in the last case.
In many cases, one is pretty sure that a particular event can
occur in some patients and not in others, although its probability
might be very low or very high. If you are sure that (based on
evidence external to the collected data) one single case of the
event has ever occurred, a possible event rate of zero is no longer
possible. In this case, we would advocate a uniform prior (that
assigns only a very small prior probability to the chance that the
rate is zero or 1), and in this case the distribution to be used in
PSA is beta(a + 1, b + 1). Briggs et al. [14] also noted the problem
of using beta(a,b) for data with zero rates, and proposed using
distributions based on such priors here.
However, there might be situations where one seriously ques-
tions whether the event could occur at all. For example, one
might model the probability of hair color changing to pink as a
result of taking a particular red-colored drug, which it is rumored
to do on the Internet. The outcome is included in the model, but
we do not think this effect possible from a biological point of
view. Still, the Haldane prior does not seem prudent in this case
either as this would make a zero rate already a certainty based on
a study with only a few subjects. A better choice in this case is the
Jeffrey’s prior (beta(0.5, 0.5)), an intermediate prior between the
Haldane prior and uniform prior.
Ratio Measures
Ratio measures, like odds ratios (ORs) and (hazard) rate ratios
(HRs), are generally modeled on the logarithmic (log) scale, using
mostly logistic regression (modeling the log[OR]) for count data
or proportional hazards regression (modeling the log HR) for
survival data. These models yield parameter estimates and
parameter (co)variances on the log scale. When such ratio mea-
sures are used as input in a health economic model, BCS advise
that their uncertainty is modeled by a normal distribution on the
log scale, using the parameter estimate (log OR or log HR) as
mean, and the standard error of the log(OR) or log(HR) as
standard deviation. From a Bayesian point of view, this normal
distribution is the posterior distribution of the log(OR) or
log(HR) given the data used in the logistic or proportional
hazards model and assuming a uniform prior distribution on
log(OR) or log(HR), that is, assuming that all values of log(OR)
or log(HR) have equal probability.
In modeling effects of interventions, however, one uses the
ratio itself, not the log of the ratio. For instance, event rates are
modeled by multiplying baseline event rates with the RR itself,
not with its logarithm. So, it is the ratio itself, and not the
log(ratio) that is usually proportional to the outcome in a health
economic setting.
The implicit uniform prior on log(OR) or log(HR) (uniform
prior on the log scale) at ﬁrst sight seems reasonable: all values of
log(OR) or log (HR) between minus inﬁnity and plus inﬁnity are
equally likely and the average of this prior on the log scale is 0 (as
each positive value of log(OR) will cancel out a corresponding
negative value), corresponding to an OR or HR of 1. However,
an uninformative prior one scale can be informative on another
scale. On the linear scale, this prior implies a prior that is pro-
portional to 1/OR or 1/HR. Despite the fact that this prior
assigns probabilities that decline with increasing OR or HR
values, this prior has an average of inﬁnity. Thus, with a limited
amount of empirical information, the average of the posterior
will partly reﬂect the inﬁnitely high average of the implicit prior.
To illustrate this, we will use the example of using an RR on
larynx cancer in current smokers compared to never smokers, as
taken from a meta-analysis [17] (RR 6.76 with a 95% conﬁdence
interval of [2.86, 16.0]). The statistical methods used in meta-
analysis yield an estimate of log(RR) and a standard error of the
estimated log(RR). Figure 3 shows three different prior distribu-
tions that could be considered in this case and which are dis-
cussed below. Figure 4 displays the corresponding posterior
distributions (the potential input distributions for PSA) for this
RR on larynx cancer that are based on these three different prior
distributions. Two of the plotted prior distributions in Figure 3
are improper priors, that is, their integral is inﬁnite. This means
that they cannot be rescaled to a probability density, which must
integrate to 1. In other terms, their scaling constant is inﬁnitely
small and we can therefore not plot these prior distributions.
Here, we therefore plotted a function that is proportional to
these priors, choosing an arbitrary scaling constant. Note,
however, that an improper prior still can have a ﬁnite mean.
We start with discussing the prior that is implicit in the
meta-analytic model, as recommended by BCS (the solid lines in
Figs. 3 and 4). The implicit prior in this case is a uniform prior on
the scale on which the analysis was carried out, in this case on the
log(RR). The posterior probability of the RR in this case follows
the lognormal distribution given by the solid curve in Figure 4.
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Here, the median of this posterior distribution is equal to 6.8, the
original point estimate. If this posterior distribution is used in
PSA, in a model where the outcome value would just be a copy
of the input, the mean outcome will be approximately 10%
higher (7.4) than 6.8, reﬂecting the fact that the mean of a
lognormal distribution is higher than its median. The less precise
the estimate of the RR, the higher the mean of the lognormal
distribution of the RR relative to its median. Generally, however,
RRs used in modeling are fairly precise, and the difference
between the median and the mean is smaller than in our example.
However, in models where several RRs are multiplied with each
other (adding also nonlinearity to the model), the overall effect
could become large enough to be of practical interest.
An alternative to the BCS recommendations is to assume a
uniform prior (on the interval zero to inﬁnity) on the RR itself
instead of on log(RR) (dotted line in Fig. 3). This leads to the
posterior distribution given by the dotted line in Figure 3. As can
be seen, the mode of this function (the MLE) is 6.8 (the ﬁgure
given by the meta-analysis), but its mean is even higher than
when using a uniform prior on log(RR) (the solid line). This is
because assuming a uniform prior (between zero and inﬁnity) on
the RR itself has an average that is even higher than that of a
uniform prior on log(RR). This approach therefore does not
solve the problem of having a prior distribution with an average
of inﬁnity.
To us, assuming a prior distribution for the RR that has an
average of inﬁnity does not seem realistic, and we would prefer a
prior that converges to a sensible ﬁnite value. A prior that has
this characteristic and that is also mathematically convenient is a
lognormal distribution, characterized by its parameters mprior and
sigmaprior.
Such a lognormal prior on RR yields a posterior for RR
(dashed line in Fig. 4) that is a lognormal distribution with
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where mpost is the posterior mean of log(RR), mlik the point esti-
mate for log(RR) from the meta-analysis, and sigmalik the stan-
dard error of log(RR) from the meta-analysis. By choosing a
sufﬁciently large value for sigmaprior, one could make sure that the
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This prior is given by the dashed line in Figure 3. These are
exactly the values for mpost and spost that BCS advise to use if one
wants the expectation of the probabilistic distribution to corre-
spond to the point estimate from a log link generalized linear
model. It can be seen that this advice can be justiﬁed from using
the vague prior described earlier.
In our example, the RR was larger than 1. If it would have
been smaller than 1 (for instance, in case of a treatment effect),
then using a uniform prior on the log scale would yield a poste-
rior with a mean closer to 1 than the original point estimate
(representing a smaller treatment effect). The alternative prior
again would yield a mean equal to the original point estimate.
Discussion
The importance of a Bayesian outlook in health economic mod-
eling has been stated before [6,18]. We feel that this should be
extended to the topic of deﬁning input distributions as used in
sensitivity analysis. The reasoning that such input distributions
should be founded on data only is tempting. Such reasoning has
brought us likelihood-based statistics, but, unfortunately, for
purposes other than summarizing evidence from data, the rea-
soning is deceptive. When working with the uncertainty of an
estimated parameter, one uses the Bayesian concept of posterior
probability, which is always based on an assumed prior. The
choice of such a prior therefore should be discussed.
One important option of the Bayesian outlook is that one can
specify “informative” prior distributions for the parameters of
interest, using any relevant information available and without
being constrained to a prespeciﬁed form for the posterior distri-
butions. The resulting posterior distributions can then be used in
0 1 2 3 4 5
relative risk
prior probability density
Figure 3 Possible prior probabilities for a ratio: uniform prior on the log-ratio
scale (solid line), uniform prior on the ratio scale (dotted line), or lognormal
prior with m = -0.5 s2 (here,we plotted s2 = 100;dashed line).The second prior
has an inﬁnitely large value at ratio = 0, while the lognormal prior is equal to 0
at ratio = 0.
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relative risk
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Figure 4 Posterior distribution for a ratio using a uniform prior on the ratio
itself (dotted line), using a uniform prior on the log ratio (solid line), and using
the alternative prior described in the text (dashed line).The reference line gives
the value of the point estimate of the ratio as calculated in the meta-analysis.
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the economic analysis, which then is based on all existing rel-
evant information. This is surely the optimal approach from a
scientiﬁc point of view, but in economic evaluations, where ﬁnan-
cial stakes are often high, one prefers to use information based on
hard facts as much as possible, in order to avoid the semblance of
having manipulated the data.
In health economical modeling expectancies rather than
modes or medians are the summarizing entities of interest. If
input parameters have skewed distributions, it generally is the
mean of this distribution rather than its mode or median that is
related to the expected value of the outcome. It is therefore
intuitive to “doctor” the distribution of an input parameter in a
way that its mean is equal to our “best estimate” for that param-
eter (mostly an MLE estimator). We show that in case of a ratio
measure, the justiﬁcation of this method is that one implicitly
chooses a prior distribution on the RR that has an average of 1
(which is conservative, but sensible), instead of the standard
prior which has an average of zero on the log ratio scale, but an
average of inﬁnity on the ratio scale. The latter, in our opinion,
does not make a sensible prior, as inﬁnity is an unrealistic value.
For proportions, however, we do not advocate the approach
of using a beta distribution with parameters equal to the
number of positives (a) and negatives (b) in the data, despite its
advantage of similarly forcing the distribution into having an
expected value equal to the MLE. The reason is that it prescribes
complete certainty in cases where zero positives or negatives are
observed. Especially when events are rare and/or data sets are
split up in many subpopulations, such situations are not uncom-
mon.
Instead, we propose using a uniform prior distribution in
those cases where one is sure that values of 0% and 100% are
extremely unlikely, implying the use of a beta distribution with
parameters a + 1 and b + 1. If values of 0% or 100% are likely,
Jeffrey’s prior is a good choice, implying a beta-distribution with
parameters a + 0.5, b + 0.5.
Although these recommendations are in the spirit of BCS,
they nevertheless differ subtly from the ﬁnal recommendations
made in BCS. Its relevance to the outcome, however, in many
cases will be minimal. First, in all cases where data are ample, the
inﬂuence of the type of prior that has been chosen will vanish.
Second, the uncertainty of modeling is only partly due to param-
eter uncertainty [20], and parameter uncertainty in turn is only
partly due to the type of uncertainty on which we have focused
here. The estimates of uncertainty given by a statistical model
only reﬂect the uncertainty for populations that are completely
similar to the study population in which the data were observed.
In reality, there often is considerable uncertainty on whether
study results can be generalized to the population of interest in
the health economic problem. Ignoring this uncertainty inﬂu-
ences results of PSA more than the subtle changes because of
following the recommendations given here. Nevertheless, the
recommendations given here are just as simple and just as easy to
implement, and so there is no real reason not to use them.
We restricted the topic of this article to two simple, but
frequently occurring types of input parameters. We did not
discuss topics as including uncertainty on the distributional form
of the input parameters [18,19] or using more complex methods
of Bayesian evidence synthesis [7], mostly using MCMC. In the
latter case, the posterior joint distribution from these methods
can directly be used as input for PSA.
Summarizing, considering the (implicit) priors used in
constructing input distributions for PSA, we recommend
using a lognormal distribution for ratios, with median
exp(log(RR) - 0.5*se2)) and standard error equal to se, and a
beta distribution with parameters a + 1 and b + 1 for propor-
tions. Only in cases where a real proportion of 0 or 1 is antici-
pated, a beta distribution with parameters a + 0.5 and b + 0.5
might be preferable.
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